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ABSTRACT 
Given a number of marine vessels treating the liquefied natural gas either as cargo or fuel, this paper 
examined the regulatory gaps of two different international Codes - the International Code of the 
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk and the International Code of 
Safety for Ships Using Gases or Other Low-flashpoint Fuels - from the regulatory standpoint. Results 
of the gap analysis have identified and discussed the key areas encountered with regulatory 
discrepancies or ambiguities that might interrupt the proper design and operation of LNG carrier and 
LNG fuelled ship. A systematic investigation and harmonization process across the Codes was 
proposed to mitigate the potential issues that may arise from the discordant regulations. Also, the 
International Maritime Organization was suggested to take proactive action to improve such 
dissonances while a general insight into the importance of filling those gaps was provided for rule-
makers and stakeholders. 
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Nomenclature 
BLG   Bulk Liquids and Gases 
BOG   Boil Off Gas 
CCC   Carriage of Cargoes and Containers 
CO2    Carbon Dioxide 
DWT   Deadweight Tonnage 
ESD   Emergency Shutdown 
fcn  collision damage factor 
fl   longitudinal factor 
FSRU   Floating Storage Regasification Units 
ft   Transerverse(Inboard penetration) factor  
fv  Vertical factor  
IGC Code International Code of the Construction and Wquipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied 
Gases in Bulk 
IGF Code International Code of Safety for Ships Using Gases or Other Low-flashpoint Fuels 
IMO   International Maritime Organization 
ISO   International Organization for Standardization 
KR   Korean Register  
LFL   Low Flammable Level 
LNG   Liquefied Natural Gas 
MARVS  Maximum Allowable Relief Valve Setting 
MSC   Maritime Safety Committee 
NOx   Nitrogen Oxides 
PRV   Pressure Reief Valve 
SIGTTO  Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators 
SOLAS  Safety of Life at Sea 
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SOx   Sulphur Oxides 
   
4 
 
1. Introduction 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a convenient form for maritime transport to markets where bulk 
pipelines are not technically or economically feasible (Aronson and Westermeyer 1982; Mankabady 
1979). Specially-designed cryogenic marine vessels, known as LNG carriers, have been used for its 
transportation. Since January 1959 when the first LNG carrier, MV Methane Pioneer, (5,034 DWT) 
has emerged, the worldwide LNG fleet has reached 478 vessels at the end of 2017 (IGU 2018). 
On the other hand, with the increasing trend of cleaner shipping, the environmental benefits of using 
LNG as a new source of marine fuel have been proven significant, compared to existing marine diesel 
fuels (Ryuichi et al. 2018). LNG fuelled ships other than gas carriers have been in service since 2000 
and have consistently contributed to reducing ocean emissions such as CO2, SOx, NOx and particulates 
(Jeong et al. 2017; Øyvind and Erikstad 2017; Rahim et al. 2016). The number of LNG fuelled ships 
has increased dramatically over the past few years, totalling 121 vessels in operation and 126 ships on 
orders as of the April of 2018 (DNVGL 2018). 
LNG is a convenient form of natural gas that can reduce its volume to 1/600 times. For liquefaction, 
the temperature of the medium is normally maintained at around -163 °C at atmospheric pressure in a 
specially-insulated cryogenic tank (Saleem et al. 2018). In the event of a leak, the liquid would rapidly 
evaporate when exposed to normal atmospheric conditions. This rapid phase transition can pose a 
direct danger to humans. In particular, cryogenic temperatures cause burns to nearby people, and 
massive vaporisation suffocates to anyone in a confined space. Leaky media can also cause severe 
damage to the ship structure, such as structural embrittlement, when it touches a ship hull.  
On the other hand, people can obscure the fact that LNG is a more dangerous substance that can be 
fired or exploded if given the opportunity to ignite. The type of fire and explosion may depend on the 
surrounding conditions on whether open or confined. Although the probability of a fire or explosion 
is lower than the direct risks, the consequences of such an accident are tremendously high. Given the 
risk that can be expressed as a combination of the probability and the consequence, the safety issues 
associated with the transport or use of LNG for marine purposes must be understood and handled 
properly. 
Not surprisingly, in an effort to enhance the safety of LNG handling, International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has developed two international Codes: International Code of the Construction 
and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code), in 1986 and subsequent 
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amendments in 1994 and 2014 and International Code of Safety for Ship Using Gases or Other Low-
flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code), which came into force on 01 January 2017. 
 
1.1. IGC Code 
The IGC Code, firstly adopted in 1983, has been uniformly applied to LNG carriers engaged in 
international voyages. It provides the international standards for the safe transport of liquefied gases 
and other specified substances stated in Chapter 19 of the IGC Code through maritime transport routes 
to minimise risks to ships, crew and the environment. To meet recent technical trends, the IGC Code 
has undergone a significant revision to safety requirements related to the location of cargo tanks, 
personnel, fire protection, turret compartment, etc. in 2014. Figure 1 summarises the brief history of 
the IGC Code. 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of IGC Code. 
 
1.2. IGF Code 
Until the 21st century, there was no safety regulation for LNG fuelled ships other than LNG carriers. 
Due to the remarkable growth of ships using LNG fuels backed by stringent environmental regulations, 
it became an urgent matter to develop a unified international Code. In this context,  
IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) began developing new regulations in 2004 to ensure the 
safety of LNG fuel vessels. As a result, IMO Res.MSC.286 (85) (IMO 2009) - Interim Guidelines on 
Safety for Natural Gas-fuelled Engine Installations in Ship was adopted in 2009. For the next phase 
of work, the IGF Code has entered into force on the 1st of January 2017. This Code particularly deals 
with mandatory provisions for the arrangement, installation, control and monitoring of machinery, 
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equipment and systems for using low-flash point fuels which can be applied for LNG fuelled ships to 
minimize the risk to the ship, its crew and the environment, taking into account the nature of the fuel 
concerned (IMO 2015c). As of 2017, the IGF Code is to be applied to approximately 200 LNG fuelled 
ships in various ship types such as passenger ships, tankers and bulk carriers, container ships, dry cargo 
vessels, service and supply vessels, car/passenger ferries, PSVs, and Ro-Ro vessels. (Corkhill 2017). 
The timeline of IGF Code is summarized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of IGF Code. 
While developing the two codes, there have been several issues. In the meeting of IMO Sub-Committee 
on Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG), at its fifteenth session, it was addressed that the draft of two codes, 
particularly, the safety requirements of engine rooms, should be harmonised as recognising that the 
IGF Code has broader implications for using LNG as fuel rather than cargo. For regulatory 
harmonisation, the BLG had to establish a joint correspondence group (IMO 2011e; IMO 2012a). In 
the development of the IGF Code, it has been stated that the Code should be aligned with the draft 
revised IGC Code as much as possible because many parts of LNG fuelled ships are very analogous 
to the counterparts of LNG carriers (IMO 2011a, 2011b, 2011e; IMO 2012a). However, since the two 
Codes were developed at similar times, the unification works failed to be made properly. Moreover, 
different working groups in IMO were so dedicated to each code that the safety requirements of the 
two Codes were deemed to diverge. Under this circumstance, the correspondence group had to concede 
that it was difficult to seek alignment in the condition that one of them was almost finalised, whereas 
the other was still under development (IMO 2011d; IMO 2012a). At MSC 92, it has been agreed that 
the new IGC Code should not set a precedent for the IGF Code while their relationship would be 
discussed once the two codes are finalised (IMO 2013b). Given that, at MSC 95, the IGF Code was 
adopted (IMO 2015c). 
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It is worth noting that any ship using low-flash point fuel is required to comply with either the IGC or 
the IGF Code but they can't both applied to the same ship. i.e. Gas carriers will be exempted from the 
application of the IGF Code. 
As can be seen from the Figure 3, except for the engine room, LNG fuelled ships and LNG carriers 
have different functions, layout and design features and risks to some extent, which is why it is 
necessarily to have separate regulations. Nonetheless, the regulatory differences still can confuse 
stakeholders since they have considerable similarities but also areas of inconsistencies, particularly 
engine room systems. The potential for future inconsistency, misinterpretation and misunderstanding 
of regulations in a fast expanding sector of the industry would inevitably lead to an increase in incidents 
which would threaten both ship and human lives in addition to legal allegations. Therefore, the 
necessity of actions to be taken in order to avoid such outcomes is paramount. 
Based on the background above, the aim of this paper was to compare and contribute to harmonizing 
these codes by identifying the regulatory gaps between the IGC Code and the IGF Code. 
 
Figure 3. Brief arrangements of LNG fuelled ship and LNG carrier. 
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2. Research method 
As the approach to conducting the comparative analysis, first of all, the two Codes were examined 
chapter by chapter as shown in Table 1. Then, in order to draw a comprehensive understanding of the 
history and the technical background of the two Codes, this paper reviewed most of the IMO 
documentations and working group reports associated with the development of these Codes. The 
know-how gained through the implementation of Korean Register projects and feedback received from 
stakeholders, particularly the shipowners and shipyards were used for this analysis. As a process of 
the gap analysis, the safety requirements of the IGC Code were applied to a 180K LNG carrier and a 
7.5K small LNG bunkering vessel, and those of the IGF Code were applied to an LNG fuelled 50K 
DWT bulk carrier and a 325K LNG fuelled ore carrier.  
 
Table 1. Chapters matching for the IGC and IGF Codes. 
IGC Code IGF Code 
Ch.1  General  Ch. 2 
and 4 
2. General 
4. General requirement 
Ch. 2  Ship survival capability and 
location of cargo tanks  
Ch. 5 5.3 Regulation – General i.e. tank location5.3 
Regulation – General i.e. tank location 
Ch. 3  Ship arrangements  Ch. 5 5. Ship design and arrangement 
Ch. 4  Cargo containment  Ch. 6 6. Fuel containment system 
Ch. 5  Process pressure vessels and 
liquids, vapour and pressure 
piping systems  
Ch. 5, 
7 and 
8 
5.7 Reg. for location and protection of fuel 
piping 
7.3 Reg. for general pipe design 
8 Bunkering  
Ch. 6  Materials of construction and 
quality control  
Ch. 7 7.4 Regulation for materials  
Ch. 7  Cargo pressure/Temperature 
control  
Ch. 6 6.9 Reg. for maintaining of fuel storage 
condition 
Ch. 8  Vent systems for cargo 
containment  
Ch. 6 6.7 Reg. for pressure relief system 
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Ch. 9  Cargo containment system 
atmosphere control  
Ch. 6  
6.10~12 Reg. on atmospheric/ environmental 
control within the fuel containment system/ fuel 
storage hold space 
6.13 Reg. on inerting 
6.14 Reg. on inert gas production and storage 
on board 
Ch. 10  Electrical installations  Ch. 12 
and 14 
12 Explosion 
14 Electrical installations 
Ch. 11  Fire protection and extinction  Ch. 11 11 Fire safety 
Ch. 12  Artificial ventilation in the cargo 
area  
Ch. 13 13 Ventilation 
Ch. 13  Instrumentation and automation 
systems  
Ch. 15 15 Control, monitoring and safety system 
Ch. 14  Personnel protection  Ch. 18 18 Operation 
Ch. 15  Filling limits for cargo tanks  Ch. 6 6.8 Reg. on loading limit for liquefied gas fuel 
tanks 
Ch. 16  Use of cargo as fuel  Ch. 5, 
9 and 
10 
5.4 Machinery concept 
9. Fuel supply to consumers 
10 Power generation including propulsion and 
other gas consumers 
Ch. 17  Special requirements  N/A N/A 
Ch. 18  Operating requirements  Ch. 18 18 Operation 
Ch. 19  Summary of minimum 
requirements  
N/A N/A 
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3. Gap Analysis between IGF Code and IGC Code 
In this section, a gas analysis identifying the differences or discrepancies of the safety requirements 
for LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships in accordance with the IGC and the IGF Codes is provided. 
There are differences between both Codes which are not necessary considered as discrepancies since 
some of these differences are justified due to the change of the functions, sizes, application 
environment, and risks. 
 
3.1. Risk assessment 
According to the IGC Code 1.1.10, while not specifically required to LNG carriers, risk assessment is 
commonly applied to the floating storage regasification units (FSRUs) and ships operating for the 
purpose of receiving, processing, liquefaction and storage of gas. It is also stipulated in IGF Code 4.2 
and applied to the particular areas of LNG fuelled ships: sizing of drip trays; design of airlocks; 
liquefied gas containment system; determination of additional relevant accidental load scenarios; 
design and arrangements for bunkering station; alternative calculations for ventilation capacity for tank 
connection space; provision of gas detectors; and limit state design (IMO 2015b, 2015d). 
 
3.2. Machinery space concept 
The machinery space in which gas engines are installed and operated is particularly prone to accidents 
of fire and explosion. According to the IGF Code 5.4, LNG fuelled ships are supposed to meet one of 
the two machinery concepts: either ‘gas safe machinery space’ or ‘ESD protected machinery space’ 
(IMO 2015c). 
In the concept of the gas safe machinery space, any single fault is not allowed to cause the gas release 
into the machinery space. Therefore, preventive measures such as double-walled piping systems must 
be applied to capture the leaked gas. 
Unlike the gas safe machinery space, the gas leakage can be released into the engine room under the 
concept of the ESD protected machinery space in the event of such an accident. Instead, the entire 
machinery space affected by the initial release must be isolated without losing propulsion power. To 
11 
 
meet this requirement, two identical machinery spaces need to be segregated, meaning that any 
common boundary is not allowed (IMO 2015c). The conceptual designs for both spaces are described 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Conceptual designs for the machinery spaces. 
Gas safe machinery space ESD protected machinery space 
    
Meanwhile, a regulatory disparity was identified: while both machinery spaces are applicable to LNG 
fuelled ships based on the IGF Code, the IGC Code only accepts the concept of the gas safe machinery 
space for LNG carriers. 
The gas safe machinery space is so designed to ensure the absolute prevention from initiating gas leak. 
On the other hand, the ESD protected machinery space is focused on the post-treatment of the initial 
gas leak. Given the fact, it may be credible to think that the gas safe machinery space is inherently 
more reliable than the ESD protected machinery space. Consequently, the IMO Sub-Committee on 
Bulk Liquid and Gases (BLG) agreed that the use of the ESD machinery space concept would not be 
suitable for the gases heavier than air or having low-flash points (IMO 2011c). Nonetheless, given that 
the gas engines used for both types of vessels are identical, there still leaves ambiguity as to why ESD-
protected engine spaces are acceptable for LNG fuelled ships and why they are not for LNG carriers. 
Also, the IGF Code 9.7 limits the pressure of the gas fuel supply system for gas engines in the ESD 
protected machinery space to 10 bar. This provision technically restricts the use of all two-stroke gas 
engines that have pretty much higher fuel gas pressures than the threshold (Fernandez et al. 2017). 
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3.3.  Fuel containment system (LNG storage tank) 
There are four main types of LNG fuel tanks used on board at present: one is a membrane type 
(integrated into hull structure), and the others are independent types A, B and C respectively. Although 
LNG cargo storage tanks and fuel containment systems are identical, regulatory discrepancies have 
been found in various parts of the safety requirements. 
3.3.1. Tank location 
Both Codes provide specific guidelines on LNG tank location to secure the LNG tank from external 
damages such as collision and grounding by keeping the minimum distance of the LNG tank from the 
ship side and bottom hull. The safety distance is determined in accordance with the hazardous levels 
of the liquid stored in the tank expressed as Type 1G, 2G and 3G; Type 1G is regarded the most 
hazardous cargos whereas 3G is the least hazardous ones (IMO 2014c). 
The IGC Code categorises the LNG cargo into Type 2G, thereby the safety requirements for the Type 
2G tank is applicable to LNG carriers. On the other hand, the IGF Code groups the LNG fuel into the 
Type 1G, therefore the LNG fueled tank are subject to the Type 1G requirements (IMO 2013b). Table 
3 summarises the guidelines on establishing the safety distance stated in the IGC and IGF Codes; it is 
entirely credible to point out that the safety requirements for IGF Code are more strictly regulated than 
the IGC Code (IMO 2011c).  
Table 3. Requirements for tank location in a deterministic approach. 
No. Tank location Requirements 
IGC Code (Ch.2.4) 
Distance from side shell (Type 2G) 0.8~2 m 
IGF Code (Reg. 5.3.3) 
1 Transverse distance from Ship 
side 
 Ship breadth/5 m or 11.5 m, whichever 
is less at summer load water line 
2 Distance from side shell 0.8~2 m   
3 Longitudinal location  abaft the collision bulkhead 
4 Vertical distance from bottom 
shell 
Ship breadth/15 m or 2.0 m, whichever 
is less  
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As an alternative, the probabilistic approach to the distance of the LNG tank can be more flexibly 
deployed without reducing the safety aspect. In this context, the IGF Code 5.3.4 alone introduced the 
probabilistic approach to determine the safety distance using the concept of the damage stability 
analysis in accordance with SOLAS II-1 (IMO 2013a; IMO 2014a, 2014b). About this, transverse 
distance from shipside can be considered using Eq. (1). 
fCN = fl · ft · fv             (1) 
Where, fCN is the parameters to be included in a simplified assessment of probability for hitting the 
tank in a collision (fCN shall be less than 0.02 for passenger ships and 0.04 for cargo ships); fl is the 
longitudinal factor; ft is the inboard penetration factor; and fv is the vertical factor. 
Given that whether it is a form of cargo or fuel, the storage of the LNG in a vessel is technically same 
and there may be no or inconsequential difference in the potential risk associated with mechanical and 
external damages, the regulatory disparity is contrary to what our common knowledge tells us; that is 
the equal level of safety requirements should be affixed in both Codes. 
 
3.3.2. An arrangement of tank pipe connection 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the comparative analysis of tank pipe connections. 
Table 4. Requirements for tank pipe connection 
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IGC Code IGF Code 
  
 
 
The key differences are described as below: 
 The IGF Code 6.3.1 requires that the maximum allowable relief valve setting (MARVS) be 1.0 
MPa or less regardless of tank type. In the IGC Code 4.23, the setting pressure for type C tank 
can be set 1.0MPa or higher. 
 Pipes mounted on the head of the LNG cargo tank are to be fitted above the highest LNG level 
in the tanks (IGC Code 5.5.2.1); if using type C fuel tank having the tank connection space, the 
pipes can be connected below the highest liquid level following the IGF Code 6.3.5. 
The concept of the tank connection space described in the IGF Code is compared to the equivalence 
of the IGC Code in Table 5. According to the IGF Code 6.3.4, if the tank connection space is not on 
the open deck, all connection systems - piping, fittings, flanges, tank valves, etc. - are to be exclusively 
arranged within the tank connection space or what is so-called ‘Cold Box’ which are to be designed to 
seize the LNG leakage if any. Meanwhile, in the LNG carriers, all piping systems connected to the 
cargo tank is to be directed from the weather decks(IGC Code 5.2.2.1.3)(IMO 2015c). 
The differences of safety requirement for tank pipe connection between the IGF and IGC Codes may 
not lead to significant controversy in ship design, construction and operation. However, this 
information and justification are believed to help stakeholders to gain a better understanding during 
applications of the two Codes. 
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Table 5. Concept of tank pipe connection. 
IGC Code IGF Code 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3. Arrangement of pressure relief system 
In order to prevent the unwanted gas release out of the pressure relief valve (PRV) from escalating 
incidents, each code provides the safety requirements for arranging the PRVs in different ways which 
are described in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. An arrangement of pressure relief system. 
 
Arrangement 
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IGC 
Code 
 
IGF 
Code 
  
 
 
The key differences are described as below: 
 IGC Code 8.2.11.1 demands that the outlet from the cargo pressure relief valve (PRV) be 
arranged at least 10m distance from the nearest - air intake, air outlet or opening to 
accommodation spaces, service spaces and control stations, or other non-hazardous areas - or 
equal to ship breadth or 25 m, whichever is less. 
 IGF Code Part A-1, 6.7.2.8 requires the outlet from the pressure relief valves should be placed 
at minimum 10 m distance from the non-hazardous areas, such as service and control spaces, air 
intake and outlet or opening to accommodation and exhaust outlet from machinery installations. 
Although both Codes require the safety distances from the non-hazardous areas, the level of such 
distances is divergent based on whether they are fuel tanks or cargo tanks (IMO 2014c; IMO 2015c). 
This regulatory discrepancy needs to be justified in a clearer way through systematic studies on 
investigating the adequacy and inadequacy of both codes. 
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For an example of the IGF Code, the safety distance of 10 m may be not applicable to small ships; 10 
m distance may be not significant for large ships, while it may be for small ships. Therefore, it was of 
a view that the degree of safety requirements of the IGF Code should be coupled with a risk-based 
approach rather than the size of the ship. 
 
3.3.4. Control of tank pressure and temperature 
To control of tank pressure, temperature and Boil Off Gas (BOG) in both Codes, one of the following 
methods should be applied with design range: re-liquefaction and thermal oxidation(combustion) of 
the vapour, liquefied gas fuel cooling or pressure accumulation (IMO 2014c; IMO 2015c). Table 7 
indicates the relative applicability of the four methods with the sample of Type C LNG fuel tank and 
membrane cargo tank which are most widely applied tanks to data. The term "applicability" is used to 
measure how the proposed method is compatible with actual operating characteristics. 
It is viewed that the difference in the relief valve setting values of the tank led to the different 
applicability in terms of the methods of re-liquefaction of vapour and pressure accumulation.  
According to the IGF Code 6.9.1.1, the pressure and temperature of the LNG fuel tanks should be 
controlled and maintenance for a period of minimum 15 days after the initial activation of these safety 
systems. Such requirements are not stated in the IGC Code for LNG cargo tanks (IMO 2016c). 
 
Table 7. Applicability of control system for tank pressure and temperature 
 
Methods Equipment IGF Code 
(C Type Fuel Tank) 
IGC Code 
(Membrane Tank) 
1 
Re-liquefaction of vapour Re-liquefaction System 
√ √√ 
2 
Thermal oxidation of vapour 
Internal Combustion Engines, 
Boilers, Gas Turbines √√ √√ 
Gas Combustion Unit 
√ √√ 
3 
Pressure accumulation Pressure Relief Valve, Insulation 
√√ √ 
4 
Liquefied gas fuel cooling Cooling Coil 
n/a n/a 
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√ : applicability low , √√ : applicability high 
 
3.4. Safety systems 
In this part, the gas analysis identifying the difference or discrepancies of the safety requirement related 
to fire safety, ventilation system, piping design, etc. between is provided. 
3.4.1.  Piping design 
Since LNG is a cryogenic media, the piping system for transferring this liquid is carefully designed. 
Both codes commonly require the piping systems with the design temperature lower than minus 110°C 
or colder to be subject to the stress analysis (IMO 2014c; IMO 2015c). 
However, the IGF Code additionally requires that the piping systems with the maximum working 
pressure of 1.0 MPa or higher, regardless of the design temperature, are subject to such analysis (IMO 
2015c). This means that the fuel supply piping systems for two-stroke gas engines applied to LNG 
fuelled ships are subject to the stress analysis while the same systems are not subject to the analysis 
when mounted on LNG carriers. The risk of the gas leak from high-pressure pipes is critical, potentially 
leading to an increase in accidents associated with the safety of ships, its crew and the marine 
environment. Given this, it was of our view that the stress analysis for the high-pressure piping system 
is to be carried out regardless of the ship types. Therefore, the update of the IGC Code is necessary.  
Additional differences pertinent to the arrangement of LNG piping systems between the two codes are 
described in Error! Reference source not found. (IMO 2014c; IMO 2015c).  
Table 8. Safety requirements for LNG piping systems. 
Items IGC Code IGF Code 
Double Wall Piping system in gas 
safe machinery spaces  
 
- Ventilated air (30 air changes/hour) 
    - Inert gas (e.g. nitrogen) 
- Ventilated air (30 air changes/hour) 
- Inert gas (e.g. nitrogen) 
- Other solution providing an equivalent 
safety level, e.g. Vacuum - especially for 
LNG 
Duct or outer pipe containing high-
pressure gas piping system 
 
NIL pipes with design temperature lower than 
- 55°C 
Duct or Outer pipe around LNG fuel NIL Pipes with design temperature lower than 
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piping system 
 
- 165°C 
 
3.4.2. Water spray system 
In terms of the regulations on the water spray system as a fixed fire-fighting system, the summary of 
the gap analysis is illustrated in Table 9. The major difference lies in the scope of the areas to be 
protected.  
The IGC Code stipulates that exposed boundaries facing the cargo area, such as deckhouses and 
bulkheads of superstructures, should be covered by the water spray system. Besides, various other 
areas to be protected by the system are defined in the IGC Code 11.3.1 (IMO 2014c). 
The coverage of the water spray system is relatively narrow for the LNG fuelled ships, compared to 
that for LNG carriers due to the extent of the hazards and the tank size limitation. Meanwhile, taking 
into account that the LNG fuel tank can be arranged in many different ways, the ship structures in the 
vicinity of the fuel tank may be exposed to the fire risk; the effect of fire near the LNG fuel tank can 
be minimized by segregating the LNG fuel tank on open decks from the boundaries of various 
hazardous and non-hazardous areas such as superstructures, compressor rooms, pump-rooms, cargo 
control rooms, bunkering control stations, bunkering stations, and deck houses. In this philosophy, the 
IGF Code 11.5.2 stipulates that the water spray system is installed for all fuel tanks placed less than 
10 m away from such boundaries (IMO 2015c). 
Table 9. Safety requirements for LNG piping systems. 
 
Arrangement 
IGC 
Code 
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IGF Code 
 
 
 
3.4.3. Duct and double wall pipes in machinery space 
Regulatory imbalances can also be found in the safety requirements for the application of the duct and 
double wall pipes shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Safety requirements for fuel gas piping systems (duct and double wall pipes) in machinery 
space. 
  
Arrangement 
IGC Code 
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IGF Code 
 
 
 
The gas safe machinery space concept in the IGC Code requires all gas piping in the machinery space 
to be enclosed in a gas-tight double barrier without openings to the engine-room.  However, ventilation 
inlets in connection with the double pipe in the machinery space may be permissible for the low-
pressure gas piping systems on the condition that gas detection system is installed in the surrounding 
engine room space (IMO 2011d). 
According to the IGC Code 16.4.4.2, ventilation inlets and outlets to the double pipe should be led to 
cargo area in case of gas fuel with the operating pressure of 1 MPa or greater (IMO 2014c). This means 
that the adverse effects of fuel gas pressure are taken into account in the IGC Code so as to minimise 
the potential risk of fire and explosion by placing the ventilation inlets and outlets in the cargo area.  
On the other hand, the IGF Code has a somewhat different view on the coverage of this safety system. 
The unified interpretation of the IGF Code 13.8.3 with regard to ventilation inlet for double wall piping 
or duct is that the ventilation inlet for the double wall piping or duct should be located in a non-
hazardous area having the open air and away from ignition sources (IMO 2016d). This implies that air 
inlets for the annular space and the gas valve unit room should be located in an open space for both 
low pressure and high-pressure gas fuel. 
This interpretation (IMO 2016a) is based on:  
 The machinery space contains multiple ignition sources. Consequently, even in gas safe 
machinery spaces, permitting ventilation inlets to draw air from the machinery space may not be 
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the best of options; 
 Inlets to ventilation systems for the hazardous area zone 1 cannot be located in the machinery 
space; 
 The actual ventilation rate is not defined by the requirement for 30 air changes per hour 
in the annular space between the inner and outer pipe(IGF 9.6.1.2). Consequently, an 
assumption that the ventilation rate will be larger than the leakage rate to prevent gas in 
the machinery space cannot be made. 
On the other hand, IMO Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC) was of the 
view that the interpretation text for IGF Code is not necessarily compatible with the IGC Code. 
Therefore, the LNG fuelled ships are subject to some different arrangements for ventilation inlets of 
the double wall piping and the duct (IMO 2016b). However, it was our thought that this regulatory 
disparity would leave the potential for future inconsistency, misinterpretation and misunderstanding 
in a fast expanding sector of the industry. 
 
3.4.4. Duct and double wall pipes outside machinery space 
For LNG carriers, the secondary enclosure of the on-deck liquid fuel gas pipe between the fuel gas 
pump in cargo tank and the high pressure pump in compressor room is not required, whereas this safety 
measures should be applied to the equivalent pipe in case of LNG fuelled ships to comply with the 
amended IGF Code 9.5.6 (IMO 2017a, 2017b) which will be adopted at 100th session of Maritime 
Safety Committee. Table 11 illustrates such a difference between the two Codes. 
 
Table 11. Safety requirements for piping systems outside machinery space. 
 
Arrangement 
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3.4.5. Ventilation  
While both Codes refer to IEC 60092-02:1999 regarding the requirements of ventilation, the IGF Code 
alone requires the mechanical ventilation system to be fitted to the tank connection space, ESD 
protected machinery space(IGF Code 13.4.1)(IMO 2014c; IMO 2015c). The safety requirements 
pertinent to mechanical ventilation systems provided in the IGF Code are represented in Table 12. 
 
 Table 12. Safety requirements for ventilation system 
IGC 
Code 
  
IGF 
Code 
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The level of the redundancy for ventilation fan in fuel preparation room is equivalent to the compressor 
room in LNG carriers. The IGF Code also provides specific parts with some flexibility concerning 
ventilation capacity for duct and double wall pipe. The capacity of the ventilation can be 30 time air 
changes per or less hour if ensuring a flow velocity of minimum 3 m/s(IGF Code 13.8.4). Furthermore, 
the reduction to 10 time air changes per hour is permitted if automatic filling of the duct with nitrogen 
is arranged upon detection of gas(IGC Code 9.6.1.2) (IMO 2015c).  
Given the uniform condition between LNG fuelled ships and LNG carriers, the fact - that the mitigation 
requirements for the ventilation capacity of the double walled pipe specified in the IGF code are 
inconsistent with the requirements of the IGC code - appears to lead to a future debate on ventilation 
requirement. 
 
3.5. Cargo manifold / bunkering station 
The installation of the vapour return line is considered optional for LNG fuelled ships, whereas it is 
mandatory to the vessels subject to the IGC Code as described in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Requirement for vapour return line. 
Items IGC Code IGF Code 
Fuel Preparation Room or 
Compressor Room  
Minimum 30 time air changes per hour 
(IGC Code 12.1.3) 
Minimum 30 time air changes per hour(IGF Code 
13.6) 
Tank connection space  N/A Minimum 30 time air changes per hour(IGF Code 
13.4) 
ESD protected machinery 
space 
N/A Minimum 30 time air changes per hour(IGF Code 
13.5.2) 
Ducts and double pipes - Minimum 30 air changes per 
hour(except when supplying the inert 
gas to double pipes) (IGC Code 
16.4.3.2) 
 
- the reduction to 10 air changes per hour is 
permitted if automatic filling of the duct with 
nitrogen is arranged upon detection of gas(IGF 
Code 9.6.1.2), or 
- 30 air change per hour or less is accepted  if 
ensuring a flow velocity of minimum 3m/s(IGF 
Code 13.8.4) 
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Items IGC Code IGF Code 
Vapour return  - Vapour return line is to be 
provided(IGC Code 5.6.3) 
- Vapour return line is optional 
- Dry disconnect type with additional safety dry 
breakaway coupling/self-sealing for quick release 
(IGF Code 8.4) 
Emergency shut-down ESD-1 or ESD-2 ESD-2 only 
Fire fighting system dry powder monitor(s) (IGC Code 
11.4.3) 
- Permanent dry chemical powder fire-
extinguishing system (IGF Code 11.6.1) 
- Portable dry powder fire extinguisher with at 
least 5 kg capacity(IGF Code 11.6.2) 
 
For LNG carriers, the cargo manifold is located in the cargo area above the weather deck in accordance 
with the IGC Code and close to the mid-ship as practicable (SIGTTO 2011). On the other hand, for 
LNG fuelled ships, the location of bunkering station can be arranged to various locations depending 
on ship characteristics such as fuel tank location, ship type, nature of cargo etc. 
In an emergency situation, cargo manifold for LNG carriers is controlled by one of the ESD-1 and 
ESD-2 defined in the SIGTTO Guideline (SIGTTO 2009). However, the bunkering system is required 
to be controlled by only ESD-2 systems such as safety dry breakaway coupling/self-sealing for quick 
release. Here are some details for ESD-1 and -2; 
 ESD-1: Emergency shutdown stage 1 - shuts down the cargo transfer operation in a quick 
controlled manner by closing the shutdown valves and stopping the transfer pumps and other 
relevant equipment in ship and shore systems. 
 ESD-2: Emergency shutdown stage 2 - shuts down the transfer operation (ESD-1) and 
uncouples the loading arms after the closure of both the ERS isolation valves. 
The IGC Code simply requires the provision of dry powder monitor(s) to protect any load/unload 
connection area, whereas the IGF Code 11.6 requires the provision of permanently installed dry 
chemical powder fire-extinguishing system as well as a portable dry powder fire extinguisher with at 
least 5 kg capacity (IMO 2014c; IMO 2015c). 
For LNG-fuelled ships, LNG bunkering is an inevitable process. The most established method of LNG 
bunkering is the transfer of LNG from the LNG terminal to the receiving vessel in a manner similar to 
the loading and unloading of LNG cargo into the cargo tank. 
26 
 
However, due to the lack of terminal infrastructure, several alternatives have emerged, such as the use 
of LNG tank trucks, LNG feeders or portable LNG tanks which may be pertinent to higher potential 
hazards than the conventional terminal bunkering. 
Although IMO and reginal organizations have developed a serise of safety requirements, particularly 
the presence of watch keeper, the installation of ESD system and firefighting systems, the failure of 
these systems cannot be ignored. The current rules and regulations concerning the design and operation 
of LNG bunkering system lack specific quantified guidelines. 
ISO/TS 18683 (ISO 2015) recommends establishing a safety exclusion zone around the LNG 
bunkering areas access to which is to be restricted to all non-essential personnel during bunkering in 
order to minimize the probability of ignition, thereby the threat to human lives if an accident. Such a 
safety exclusion zone includes the supply point and the onboard bunkering station (Jeong et al. 2017). 
Given the fact that the IGC Code for LNG carriers, or related standards, does not specify the need of 
the safety zone for LNG cargo transfer, the safety requirements on the LNG bunkering may be 
considered stringent. 
 
3.6. Miscellaneous systems 
In this part, the gas analysis identifying the differences or discrepancies of the control, monitoring and 
safety system between two(2) Codes is provided. 
3.6.1.  Temperature indicator 
LNG bunkering may encounter the potential risk of rapid fuel tank pressurization by the mixing of 
different temperature/properties of fuels which may be produced/supplied from different areas. In this 
context, the temperature indicator in LNG fuel tank is a key equipment to prevent the risk of a rapid 
rise of pressure caused by mixing fuels with different temperature before a bunkering operation. 
Besides, it is also used to prevent stratification phenomenon during the fuel agitation operation when 
some different temperature layers are confirmed after bunkering (IMO 2015a). 
Therefore, the number of temperature indicators to be installed in LNG fuel tank is more than that of 
LNG cargo tank (IMO 2015b, 2015c). According to IGF Code 15.4.11, Type C tank supplied with a 
vacuum insulation system and pressure build-up fuel discharge unit are excluded because the fuel in 
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this tank may not age by not ejecting of the boil-off gas (BOG) during the voyage and bunkering. 
Whereas, the application of this requirement of temperature indicator in the IGC Code is the same for 
all tank type including the Type C. 
 
3.6.2.  Gas detection 
The IGF Code requires a gas dispersal analysis or physical smoke test to decide the best arrangements 
for gas detectors, but the IGC Code does not specify such a requirement (IMO 2014c; IMO 2015c). 
The setting value for gas detection is also stricter at 20% Lower Explosion Limit (LEL) in the IGF 
Code than 30% LEL in the IGC Code. The IGC Code 13.6.19 requires two portable gas detection 
equipment or more while the IGF Code 15.8.6 does not specify a mandatory number. 
 
4. Discussion  
Despite the increasing popularity of LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships, the current international 
Codes seem to need some improvement in terms of achieving uniform safety requirements. There is 
some disharmony across the provisions which has never received thorough investigations. 
Typically, the design of LNG fuelled ships is analogous to conventional LNG carriers in many aspects, 
such as the arrangement of LNG storage tanks and the loading/unloading systems and their operating 
procedures. It was viewed that the regulatory inconsistencies across the two Codes may cause the 
different application of safety requirements to the exactly-same systems, leading to significant 
differences in the design of LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships. In particular, LNG carrier with gas 
engines is also regarded as the same type as the LNG fuelled ship. However, such a LNG carrier is 
only subject to the IGC Code, but not the IGF Code. Given this, regulatory discrepancies between the 
two Codes may aggravate ambiguity. It is, therefore, necessary to promote transparency in the 
disciplined regulations. 
In this context, a particular emphasis of this paper was placed on overviewing the regulatory gaps 
between the IGC and the IGF Codes in an effort to contribute to unified implementation for discordant 
provisions in these Codes. Hence, this paper suggests that the IMO should take a proactive action to 
narrow the gaps between the two Codes by proposing revisions or unified interpretations for the 
discords discussed in the previous chapters; it may either need to revise the IGC Code according to the 
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IGF Code or vice versa in order to harmonize both codes based on proper maritime architecture and 
engineering principles and practices. 
The main base of the IGF Code for ships using LNG as a marine fuel is the experience and knowledge 
of similar systems of LNG carriers. Therefore, they particularly need to be reviewed and revamped 
based on proper systematic risk assessment of the LNG fuelled ships. 
In recent years, IMO regulations have become increasingly diverse and complicated; thereby 
stakeholders encounter difficulties in designing and adapting them to ships and even costly. For 
instance, shipyards, who have extensive experience in designing LNG carriers, are confused about 
applying some different safety regulations to the same system (e.g., the engine room system) when 
constructing LNG fuelled ships. This gap is also the same for the Flag State and Classification Society 
which approves ships. In this context, this paper is believed to be a useful guide in enhancing a general 
understanding of the similarities and inconsistencies between the two Codes. It may help stakeholders 
to identify further actions to be taken, while to prevent ship designers from becoming confused by 
regulatory differences. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Through the gap analysis, it was found that the LNG-fuelled-ships are generally subject to a higher 
level of safety requirements by the IGF Code, compared to the equivalences for LNG carriers by the 
IGC Code. It seems to have originated from the gap between the brevity of LNG fuelled ships and 
LNG carriers with the perfect safety records. 
However, it was also thought that some regulations in these  Codes lacked clear technical justification, 
whereas some others appeared to be too severely applied, disregarding the successful safety record of 
LNG carriers over the several decades. 
Given the different risk natures between delivering LNG as cargo and using LNG as fuel,  the two 
Codes may not be able to be fully idential; if a clear technical justification is provided, different 
regulations may be acceptable. However, it should be noted that the eqaul level of safety requirements 
must be applied at least where the same systems and arrangements are applied. The disparity in the 
safety requirements for the engine room systems can be a good example. 
The paper suggests that the IMO should consider these findings, taking into account both experience 
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and technical developments when the IMO periodically review these Codes and consider to amend the 
regulation in the Codes. In particular, the following parts of two Codes were proposed to go through a 
rigorous revision for bridging the gaps of the safety requirement for the engine room system: concept 
of machinery space (section 3.2), the stress analysis on piping system (section 3.4.1) and the safety 
requirements for duct and double wall pipe (section 3.4.3) and ventilation (section 3.4.5) discussed in 
this paper. 
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